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LUCK EGALITARIANISM
T he term luck egalitarianism was originally coined by Elizabeth Andersonin her “What Is the Point of Equality?” (1999). Luck egalitarianism, shewrites, is “the view that the fundamental aim of equality is to compensate
people for undeserved bad luck – being born with poor native endowments, bad
parents, and disagreeable personalities, suffering from accidents and illness, and
so forth.” As a result, luck egalitarianism is focused on eliminating “the impact of
brute luck from human affairs” (Anderson 1999, 288). More generally, the focus
on involuntary inequalities is the commitment of authors Anderson described as
luck egalitarian: principally G. A. Cohen and Ronald Dworkin, but also Richard
Arneson, Eric Rakowski, as well as John Roemer (a list to which we might add
Larry Temkin). Involuntary inequalities are those that do not appropriately reflect
the choices of those who suffer them. A distinction is thus established between
inequalities which are a result of choices agents are responsible for and inequal-
ities which are the result of bad brute luck. Justice demands that the impact on
people of the latter form of inequalities be eliminated, or at least lessened. Luck
egalitarians believe that equality is one of our essential political values; and a
proper understanding of this value states that it is bad that some, through no
fault or choice of theirs, are worse off than others. (Contrast the Rawlsian claim
that inequalities are unjust if they do not benefit the least well off.)
Initially used by Anderson to bundle together a number of egalitarian
authors whose views she wished to criticize for their emphasis “on correcting
a supposed cosmic injustice,” the term luck egalitarianism is not embraced by
all of the authors she grouped under this label. G. A. Cohen is happy to bor-
row the term luck egalitarianism to describe his view, namely that “accidental
inequality is unjust” (Cohen 2008, 8). However, the same is not true of Ronald
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Dworkin, even though the critics of luck egalitarianism consider that Dworkin’s,
no less than Cohen’s views, are definitional of luck egalitarianism. See, in par-
ticular Anderson, but also Samuel Scheffler’s “What is Egalitarianism?” (2003b);
Dworkin denies that he is a luck egalitarian in his “Equality, Luck andHierarchy,”
(Dworkin 2003).
In addition to their relation to the label, authors characterized as luck egal-
itarians have many other fundamental disagreements. Which inequalities are to
be considered involuntary is an object of dispute among them. Moreover, there
isn’t even concordance on the claim that “the purpose of egalitarianism is to elim-
inate involuntary inequalities” (Cohen 1989, 916). Again, Ronald Dworkin, for
one, would deny that this is the goal of his egalitarianism. This is illustrated by
Cohen’s and Dworkin’s respective attitudes to expensive tastes. Welfare deficits
which result from unchosen expensive tastes are treated on a par with handi-
caps by Cohen and other luck egalitarians; whereas Dworkin refuses to subsidize
expensive tastes, whether chosen or not. It seems intuitively unfair, he presses, to
impose the cost of one’s preferences on others. Arguably, this attitude to expen-
sive tastes aligns Dworkin more with Rawls’s refusal to accommodate expensive
tastes in the distribution of primary goods than with pure luck egalitarians. Be
that as it may, the crucial point is that for the form of luck egalitarianism repre-
sented by Dworkin, justice does not require the removal or reduction of all types
of involuntary inequalities. Alternatively, if Cohen provides the canonical defi-
nition of luck egalitarianism with the cited formula that “accidental inequality is
unjust,” then authors such as Dworkin are not strictly speaking luck egalitarians.
Is there still a recognizable family of views here? If there is, it is to be identi-
fied by the focus on brute luck, and not by what is taken to follow in terms of com-
pensation, nor by the definition of injustice. Dworkin stands as one of the main
proponents of an egalitarianism focused on choice and luck in virtue of his now
canonical distinction between inequalities that are traceable to “brute luck” and
those which are the result of “option luck,” where the latter are risks we choose
to undertake and are responsible for. Equality, for Dworkin, consists in equal
opportunity to insure against bad luck, rather than in an ideal state of affairs in
which brute inequality has been eliminated. What justice requires, in his view, is
not that brute luck (inequalities deriving from unchosen circumstances) be elim-
inated or compensated for, but rather that people be given the equal opportunity
to insure, and so provide in advance, against them. Through equal opportunities
for insurance against bad luck, we transform many inequalities into option luck,
that is: differentials that are the upshot of a chosen gamble (Dworkin 1981, 293;
and 2000, 76). This distinction between option luck and brute luck, between how
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deliberate gambles turn out and how risks which are not deliberate gambles fall
out, might be considered the essential definitional element of luck egalitarianism.
Thus Cohen famously claims that Dworkin “has, in effect, performed for egal-
itarianism the considerable service of incorporating within it the most powerful
idea in the arsenal of the antiegalitarian right: the idea of choice and responsi-
bility” (Cohen 1989, 933). And this focus on the distinction between brute and
option luck, in turn, explains why Dworkin should be classified by many as a core
luck egalitarian, despite his explicit rejections of the label.
Luck egalitarianism might thus be considered to be no more than a loosely
bundled family of views. Its common core, nonetheless, can be defined as the
ambition to delineate a responsibility- and choice-based form of egalitarianism.
Luck egalitarians hold that it is objectionable, at least to some extent, for some
to be worse off than others through no fault, or choice, of their own. If one
person is worse off than another through no fault or choice of her own, luck
egalitarians consider that the situation is unfair, and hence that the inequality
between the two people is objectionable. This focus on the value of fairness seems
well summarized by Larry Temkin’s claim that egalitarians “generally believe that
it is bad for some to be worse off than others through no fault or choice of their
own. The connection between equality and comparative fairness explains both
the importance, and limits, of the ‘no fault or choice’ clause” (Temkin 2003, 62).
The emphasis on equality, fairness, and the fate of the least well off all seems to
echo core Rawlsian concerns. At the same time, luck egalitarians are all critical
of Rawlsian egalitarianism.
There are two ways in which luck egalitarianism relates critically to Rawls.
(a) On the one hand, it is seen by its proponents as a superior form of egalitarian-
ism, free of what is considered problematic in Rawls’s theory, namely the insen-
sitivity of the difference principle to the distinction between inequalities which
are created by voluntary choices and those which are the result of bad brute luck.
(b) On the other hand, Rawls’s focus on fairness and on “inequalities which are
arbitrary from amoral point of view” is often presented as a commitment to elim-
inating arbitrary inequalities. According to this second reading, Rawls endorses
one of the core elements of luck egalitarianism: justice demands that we even out
the effects of brute luck. Is luck egalitarianism a rival theory, or a more coherent
Rawlsian doctrine? As we shall see, luck egalitarians make both claims.
In Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Nozick accuses Rawls of arguing for economic
egalitarianism by overemphasizing social contingencies and natural chance, and
underestimating the centrality and importance of individual responsibility and
autonomy. Luck egalitarians may seem to echo and endorse this criticism. Recall
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that Rawls’s difference principle stipulates that social and economic inequalities
are just if they are to the greatest benefit of the least-advantaged members of
society. In so stipulating the difference principle, Rawls does not introduce a
distinction between inequalities deriving from choices people have voluntarily
made, and social and economic inequalities which derive from unchosen features
of those who are disadvantaged relative to others.
Picking up and expanding on Nozick’s criticism, luck egalitarians complain:
(i) that the difference principle inappropriately rewards those who are respon-
sible for their deficit in primary goods, e.g. those able-bodied who choose
not to work, or to work less hard than others, and
(ii) that the index of primary goods used in the difference principle is insensitive
to, and fails to compensate for, disadvantages some suffer relative to others
through no fault of their own. That is, Rawls accepts as just a distribution
in which some are disadvantaged through brute luck, e.g. because they are
handicapped or severely ill.
If the focus is on these two complaints, then luck egalitarianism aims at defin-
ing an alternative, more robust, form of egalitarianism by accommodating such
concerns with responsibility for the outcome of one’s choices, and with deficits
which are the effects of bad brute luck.
The second manner in which luck egalitarianism could be related to Rawls’s
work contrasts with this first line of criticism. From this second viewpoint, the
core concern of luck egalitarianism with involuntary inequalities is continu-
ous with Rawls’s insistence on fairness and his focus on inequalities which are
“morally arbitrary.” The question luck egalitarians raise is how to reconcile the
Rawlsian emphasis on arbitrary inequalities with the exact formulation of Rawl-
sian egalitarian principles of justice. Luck egalitarianism seeks to offer such a
reconciliation. By demanding that no one be disadvantaged, or advantaged, by
arbitrary factors they aim to define an egalitarianism truer to the focus on fair-
ness, and so more Rawlsian than Rawls, so to speak. More precisely, there are
two supposed inconsistencies, internal to Rawlsian theory, that luck egalitarian-
ism aims at resolving:
(i) On the one hand, the difference principle is, as mentioned, insensitive to the
choice/luck distinction. However, Rawls seems to make use precisely of this
distinction when he argues that the system of natural liberty unjustly allows
“natural and social contingencies” to have a strong impact on distribution:
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“[I]ntuitively, the most obvious injustice [of that system] is that it permits
distributive shares to be improperly influenced by these factors so arbitrary
from a moral point of view” (TJ 62–63).
(ii) On the other hand, Rawls stresses the “capacity to take responsibility for
our ends” and considers it unjust to give a greater share of primary goods
to those with expensive taste: “[I]t is regarded as unfair that [those with less
expensive taste] should have less in order to spare others from the conse-
quences of their lack of foresight and self-discipline” (“Social Unity and Pri-
mary Goods”, CP 369–370). This treatment of expensive tastes is famously
read by G. A. Cohen through luck egalitarian lenses thus: “People with
expensive tastes could have chosen otherwise, and if and when they press
compensation, others are entitled to insist that they themselves bear the
cost ‘of their lack of foresight or self-discipline’” (Cohen 1989, 913).
One can respond to both the internal and external criticisms of Rawls here. A
proper understanding of the exegetical points does not lead beyond Rawls to the
luck egalitarian position. And luck egalitarianism is neither a convincing alterna-
tive to Rawls, nor a plausible elaboration of the intuitions which ground political
egalitarian movements.
First, luck egalitarians are mistaken to think that they can best Rawls at his
own game. How can Rawls’s principles, and in particular the difference princi-
ple, be made consistent with what Rawls himself says about moral arbitrariness,
and about natural talents, expensive tastes, and self-discipline? Does Rawls rely
on premises regarding choice and luck, which the formulation of his principles
then contradicts? To these questions, Rawlsians briskly retort that Rawls’s argu-
ments support his own principles rather than luck egalitarianism. “[T]he best
explanation of the fact that Rawls’s theory of justice does not respect the dis-
tinction between choice and circumstances,” Scheffler writes, “is that Rawls is
not attempting to respect it. He simply does not regard the distinction as having
the kind of fundamental importance that it has for luck egalitarians” (Scheffler
2003b, 7; see also Scanlon 2006).
Let us note that Rawls clearly denies that inequalities which are the result
of genetic and social luck are unjust, or that they ought to be eliminated: “The
natural distribution is neither just nor unjust; nor is it unjust that persons are born
into society at some particular position. These are simply natural facts. What is
just or unjust is the way that institutions deal with these facts” (TJ 87). He thus
distinguishes between his theory and what he calls “a principle of redress”, that
is “the [luck egalitarian] principle that undeserved inequalities call for redress”
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(TJ 100). Rawls further explains that “the difference principle is not of course the
principle of redress. It does not require society to try to even out handicaps as if
all were expected to compete on a fair basis in the same race” (TJ 101).
Why, then, does Rawls emphasize the “moral arbitrariness” of facts such as
natural endowments and social factors? Justice, for Rawls, may not demand the
elimination of all effects of bad brute luck; nevertheless, he stresses that a society
which systematically disadvantages some of its members on the basis of morally
arbitrary factors, such as their natural endowments or the social environment
in which they are born, is unjust. This type of morally arbitrary discrimination
can happen through overt exclusion, but also simply because contingent social
factors happen to favour an ethnic, gender, or social group in the distribution
of resources. A just society, according to Rawls, addresses these injustices at the
outset, by redistributing to ensure for all fair and favourable background con-
ditions.
The priority of fair background conditions and the role of our institutions
in insuring that they are in place is thus what lies behind the Rawlsian empha-
sis on the moral arbitrariness of certain factors. It constitutes an explanation and
defence of the difference principle. To those who claim that they did nothing but
work hard without violating anybody’s rights, or that they competed in conditions
of formal equality of opportunity for positions which required certain talents, and
so ought to reap the rewards of their efforts, Rawls responds that “the kind of lim-
its and provisos that in Locke’s view apply to separate transactions of individuals
and associations in the state of nature are not stringent enough to ensure that fair
background conditions are maintained” ( JF 53).
A just society for Rawls is not one that meets luck egalitarian requirements,
but rather one in which each person is given the opportunities to develop their
abilities, and can do so with the guarantee of fair equality of opportunities with
others similarly talented and inclined. (See Freeman 2007b, 98, 449.) What mat-
ters is not that the consequences of bad brute luck be as far as possible eliminated,
nor that life chances be evened out (which, among other things, would require
the abolition of the family: see TJ 448), nor a fortiori that our expensive tastes,
however acquired, be satisfied in the same measure as those of others.What mat-
ters is that all have enough resources to satisfy their interest in pursuing a good
life.
In sum, then, there is no internal tension of the sort identified by luck egal-
itarians in the Rawlsian account. Nor, pace luck egalitarians, is there any need
to reincorporate individual responsibility into that story. In brief, all individu-
als have two types of responsibilities: first to contribute to maintaining favorable
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background social circumstances; second, to make a sensible use of their share of
primary goods, without imposing unreasonable demands on others.
Leaving their connection to Rawlsian principles aside, are luck egalitarians
truer to our intuitive ideals of equality than Rawls? There is no compelling case
for this. By comparison with a view focused on compensating people for unde-
served bad luck, Rawlsian egalitarianism is more theoretically ambitious. Instead
of the main emphasis on choice and luck, it aims at finding room for the multiple
values which a well-ordered society must attend to: respect for persons, needs,
opportunities, fairness, solidarity, and so on. Politically, its perspective on indi-
vidual responsibility aims at providing a feasible utopia. It does not ask society to
aim at the compensation of all disadvantages that derive from unchosen features,
all accidental inequalities (something that cannot be fully delivered anyway). Nor
does it have the sometimes implausibly harsh consequence that people should
bear the full price of their choices, and be denied compensation for disadvantages
that result from these choices. The Rawlsian account constitutes a multifaceted
theoretical take on the political ideal of equality. In line with that ideal, it explains
and motivates the need to eliminate many types of unjust inequalities. Moreover,
a Rawlsian society is prepared to repair inequalities which are not purely the
result of brute luck. Contrary to the contentions by luck egalitarians, a Rawl-
sian society measures up entirely to the standards of political egalitarianism in
its distributional and social policies. Indeed, once one reflects on the concerns of
political egalitarianism, a Rawlsian society arguably gets closer to their ends than
any society guided by luck egalitarian policies would.
Veronique Munoz-Darde
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